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THE PROVIDENT SOCIETIES 
IN THE RURAL ECONOMY OF YAOUNDE, 1945-1960* 
By Jane I. Guyer 
A British colonial administrator, writing in 1950, suggested that "in some 
ways the Societe Indigene de Prevoyance (Native Provident Society) has been as 
charact,eristic of French Colonial administration as the Native Authorities of 
our own. 11 
1 
In Cameroun, for a period of about twenty-five years between 
their foundation in 1937 and the early 1960s, the Native Provident Societies 
. . f 1 d 1 1· 2 h . d were tbe main instruments o rura eve opment po icy. T e1.r powers an 
the budgets at their disposal grew steadily and then steeply to a peak in the 
mid-1950s, and finally collapsed in the post-independence period. 
The descriptive aim of this paper is to trace the economic policies of the 
Provident Society in the Circumscription of Nyong-et-Sanaga, around the 
capital city of Yaounde. The interpretive aims are two-fold: first, to 
suggest the Society's long-term impact on local economic structures and 
second, to compare its experience with other areas of Cameroun. Ultimately 
both issues are concerned with the interaction of peasant economies and state 
policies in African history. Two opposed views have emerged in the recent 
literature on African peasantries. One tends to present a helpless peasantry 
in the grip of economic forces backed by state policy 3 while the other 
presents a (more or less) helpless state in an acrimonious "marriage of 
convenience 114 with an obstinately backward peasantry. 
Leaving aside the polemics of the issue, the challenge of local studies is 
to explore how particular policies did, in fact, affect economic structures 
*The research on which this paper is based was undertaken while the author 
was a research associate at the National Advanced School of Agriculture 
(Yaounde) and financed by a grant from the Social Science Research Council. I 
would like to thank Stephen Baier and Sara Berry for their comments. 
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and levels of activity, and conversely, how local conditions affected the 
feasibility or success of particular policies. In the Nyong-et-Sanaga region, 
Provident Society policy did foster market orientation on the part of the 
producers in a sector which was critical to the colonial economy, namely the 
food supply to the capital city. However, the provision of market outlets for 
producers and market access for consumers is a different thing from the 
creation of viable market structures linking the two: indigenous trade net-
works, wholesale markets and commercial transport facilities. What Hyden 
calls pre-capitalist forms of production did continue relatively unchanged. 
But I will argue that this is not entirely explained by the unresponsiveness 
of the peasantry; it is at least partly the outcome of a long history of 
policies which prevented or delayed the development of occupational differen-
tiation in the food sector. Provident Society policy covers one era in that 
history. 
Provident Society Structure 
The legal and political framework in which the Provident Societies 
functioned bas been described elsewhere, 5 but it bears repeating briefly to 
show that the system in Cameroun did not deviate from the general model, The 
Societies were instituted in 1937, much later than in French West Africa, but 
with a similar format. They were basically savings and credit societies for 
indigenous small producers in the primary sector. The system consisted of two 
levels: the individual societies at the local and regional level, with a 
directing committee and a Common Fund at the national level. Members of local 
societies paid an annual subscription, part of which was retained by the 
societies and part invested in the Common Fund. Further resources were made 
available to the Common Fund from the colonial budget and later from FIDES 
funds from the metropolitan government, The local societies bad control over 
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their own funds which they invested either in collective projects or loans to 
individuals, and they were also able to raise additional loans and grants from 
the Common Fund. The goal of the government was to build an investment system 
which could pursue national economic goals while leaving maximum flexibility 
to respond to particular local needs. 
The Provident Societies differed, of course, from a commercial system in 
that their functioning at all levels was inextricably linked to the colonial 
administration. At the local level, annual dues and loan repayment were 
collected by the administrative authorities exactly as if they constituted 
additional amounts over and above the compulsory head tax. The local socie-
ties corresponded to administrative subdivisions, "the smallest commanded by a 
European. 116 The European administrator was automatically its president, in 
addition to his roles as political, administrative and judicial authority. At 
the national level the governing committee was made up of personnel from the 
administration. 
This confounding of private and public was characteristic of the Provident 
Societies and a source of problems even to their advocates. As Antoine 
pointed out in his generally favorable assessment of their achievements, there 
were serious legal and financial anomalies in the Provident Society consti-
tution. 7 For example, it was far from clear how members could bring 
legitimate complaints against the Provident Society to the local court, when 
the chef de subdivision was the president of both. There was also the danger 
that Provident Society funds would become a simple slush fund for the local 
administration, to cover expenses beyond the budget. These ranged from the 
use of Provident Society funds for road maintenance to the use of Provident 
Society vehicles for tours of inspection. To take a local example, an enquiry 
at Saa showed that the Provident Society was nominally the owner of the 
furniture in the mayor's house.8 
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From the economic point of view, being a public enterprise gave a clear 
commercial advantage: exemption from many taxes and licenses as well as access 
to interest-free or low-interest loans. On the other hand, the form of 
accounting appropriate to a public enterprise failed to show the relative 
commercial viability of particular projects and therefore limited their 
ability to borrow from banks. 
To advocates of the Provident Societies, however, these kinds of problems 
were technical and did not detract form the essentially beneficial marriage of 
public and private. 
The Provident Society is truly a training ground for 
citizenship9 
This institution can be considered as a masterpiece of 
paternalist administrationlO 
To these advocates the Societies were political in order to be economically 
effective. Critics of the policy make the opposite interpretation, that their 
economic activities were subordinate to political goals. For example, Korn 
suggests that the great expansion of local "development" schemes and coop-
erative structures during the 1950s is largely explained by the urgent needs 
of the administration to control political activity in the rural areas • 11 
In fact, many official statements support this view. At the height of inter-
nal strife in 1955 the administration launched a new rural credit program 
(Petit Equipement Rural), to be run through the Provident Society structure, 
with the explicit aim of providing "the promise of stability at the same time 
as a means of raising the standard of living of the rural population. ulZ 
The Provident Societies were also used as a means for controlling the activi-
ties of the peasant cooperatives which sprang up after the war. On the 
grounds that their finances were poorly run, the government made all loans and 
advances to them contingent on the guarantee of their local Provident Society, 
or, in effect, the local administration. From the critic'.s point of view the 
"abuses" of Provident Society funds for political and administrative purposes 
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in fact reflect their basic purpose. Suret-Canale states quite simply that 
"administrative control was precisely the intrinsic vice of the Provident 
Societies. 1113 
There is no doubt that the Provident Societies supported the administra-
tion from its most serious needs for an effective control system to the most 
venial needs of individual functionaries, But it did pursue particular 
economic policies and it did funnel more investment funds into the rural areas 
than any other previous system, Before considering how these were spent in 
the Yaound~ area, one needs a brief overview of the investment history of the 
Provident Societies at the national level. 
Provident Society Investment Policy 
Although the Provident Societies were established in 1937, their period of 
growth began after the Second World War and was extremely rapid. In 1946 their 
total income was 31 million francs and total expenditure 25 million. 14 One 
decade later the corresponding figures approached 2,000 million, an increase 
by a factor of sixty. 15 What accounted for this was not increases in 
membership dues but greatly expanded opportunities for the Provident Societies 
to acquire funds from outside sources. The important turning point was 1954. 
During the earlier period the basic infrastructure in each region was set 
up: long-term policy was defined, personnel were hired, storage and transport 
facilities were built up, offices constructed, and relations established with 
the existing commercial sector. At the same time various small "welfare" 
projects were pursued: wells were dug, feeder roads maintained, and experi-
ments made in housing construction, On the basis of their regular, guaranteed 
income from membership dues, the local Societies were able to borrow from the 
Common Fund and do an annual business to a value seven times as high as the 
dues themselves. 
When new investment funds became available during the 195Os, the Provident 
Societies were clearly the major rural institutions which could absorb them, 
6 
As a result the loans which the Societies raised from all sources rose from 36 
million francs in 1952 to 212 million in 1954. 16 Over the same two years 
their total annual business doubled, from 768 to 1,876 million francs • 1 7 In 
addition they acted as guarantor for local cooperatives for a total of 79 mil-
lion, and in 1955 received a further 128 million from FIDES for the develop-
ment of rural technology. 18 To give some idea of the magnitudes involved, 
the total resources controlled by the Provident Societies in 1955 was five 
times as high as the budget for the regular agricultural services of the 
administration. 19 
As a result the Societies became more commercially oriented than they had 
been in the past. In their founding charter the activities had been defined 
as "to take all measures which contribute to the development of agriculture, 
animal husbandry, fishing and gathering," including, but not in any way 
limited to, the commercialization of crops. By 1956 their unique role was 
defined far more precisely: "to alleviate the effects of neglect by the 
private sector. 1120 They became active commercial enterprises in their own 
right, directing their attention to areas which had not yet attracted private 
business but which nevertheless appeared to have some potential for commer-
cial viability. The following paragraph from the U.N. Report clearly express-
es the scale of priorities, and the breadth of their activities: 
The Provident Societies collect and sell the agricultural 
products of their members: rice, groundnuts, manioc, 
millet. They process certain of these products thanks to 
the construction of rice mills, oil-works, - workshops for 
the shelling and storage of coffee, They find sales 
outlets for certain local products (dried fish, fresh 
vegetables, craftwork). They also facilitate the 
provisioning of their members in construction materials, 
wood, roofing material, cement or food items at better 
prices, and, for their own account, they run quarries, 
carpentry workshops, and timber-works; they provide seed, 
fertilizer, and all kinds of goods and merchandise to 
areas neglected by commerce, or they compete with commerce 
in order to maintain normal market conditions. They 
practice a certain number of pilot activities: pig and 
poultry-raising, fish-farming, nurseries, etc.21 
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Four years after this glowing description was written the Provident Societies 
were in the process of rapid decline, There was strong political opposition 
to the compulsory system for dues collection and the whole enterprise was 
indelibly marked with colonialism. However, the fatal blow appears to have 
been the suppression of the credit facilities (circulation fiduciaire) of the 
Common Fund. Over a period of two years, from 1958 to 1960 the resources of 
the Common Fund fell to one eighth of its 1958 value, Sources of loan capital 
were reduced to membership dues and interest on reserves, which by this time 
had become very small contributors to the total funds. By 1962 the Provident 
Societies of the South were described as if they were already defunct. 22 
As the major credit institution in the rural areas they were, in fact, 
totally abolished. However, no multi-functional institution can disappear 
overnight. Local administrative budgets needed contributions from Provident 
Society Funds, and compulsory dues continued to be paid until at least 1965. 
In 1969 a new form of "annual obligatory savings fund" was instituted, the 
Soci~t~ Mutuel pour le D~veloppement Rural (SOMUDER), whose charter explicitly 
states that it replaces the Provident Society. 23 But its scope is local and 
there is no powerful financial structure behind it. Farmers in areas where 
the Provident Society was inactive are inclined to say that the two institu-
tions are the same thing, and that both are nothing but an extra tax. But 
from the point of view of entire regional economies they had different func-
tions and capacities. Throughout the post-independence period the government 
has searched for solutions to the problem of credit to the smallholder sector, 
that is, for an acceptable successor to the Provident Societies. 
The Provident Societies in Nyong-et-Sanaga 
The region of Nyong-et-Sanaga has always been one of the most important 
cash crop producers because of its large population and specialization in 
cocoa. However, by the time the Provident Societies were instituted, cocoa 
marketing was already tightly organized by commercial firms, Consequently 
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there were few possibilities for the Societies to intervene in the cocoa 
economy, and these were limited to non-profit activities. For example, they 
organized nurseries for cocoa seedlings, advanced loans for the construction 
of cement drying-platforms and drying-barns (s~choirs autobus), and during the 
price crisis of 1956 they financed the construction of rural bulking centers. 
They also guaranteed the credit extended to local cooperatives, but the latter 
were weak. 
The critical economic function the Provident Societies fulfilled was the 
feeding of Yaound~, the capital city: "The provisioning of Yaound~, in indi-
genous food, small livestock, fresh vegetables and rice are the main activ-
ities of the Provident Society. 1124 The food supply to Yaound~ was exactly 
the kind of problem the Societies aimed to resolve, namely a poorly function-
ing but important and potentially viable sector of the local economy which was 
of little or no interest to the large commercial firms. 
The reasons why food supply to the urban market presented such a problem 
are rooted in the confrontation between the indigenous and colonial econ-
omies. 25 When Yaound~ became the capital in 1922 there were no indigenous 
commercial food markets in the surrounding area. Instead of encouraging the 
creation of such a system, the colonial government instituted requisitions 
administered by the chiefs and backed by the provisions of the indig~nat. 
When the indig~nat was abolished in 1946, chieftaincy powers went into rapid 
decline, provoking a crisis of administration which, in some areas, was 
described as "catastrophic. 1125 The Political Report for the Subdivision of 
Yaound~ for 1950 is entirely devoted to problems of adjustment to "the great 
reforms of the post-war period," the problems of redefining the chieftaincy 
system, and the creation of an alternative type of indigenous civil servant. 
Faced with a vacuum in the food supply system, the administration turned 
to the Provident Societies, its only tool to implement economic policy in the 
rural areas. As in the early 1920s they were reluctant to leave it to market 
9 
forces, fearing that supplies would be erratic, insufficient and expensive. A 
series of different interventions were designed, in marketing, processing and 
production. 
The most important and most urgently implemented plan was the creation of 
a wholesale trade, since production was small-scale, scattered and poorly 
served by transport. The local Provident Societies were to act as rural 
bulking centers; they purchased from the women farmers, stored the crops, 
negotiated sales contracts and often provided the transport to the buyers. At 
the purchasing end of the transaction, the government helped to create and 
organize urban consumer cooperatives, which handled the retail trade. Thanks 
to the special advantages of the Provident Societies, this system could supply 
food cheaper than local traders. According to the U.N. Report for 1950, 
the consumer cooperatives continue to play their role in 
the provisioning of the urban populations, as much in the 
subdivisions far from the large centers where they are the 
only institutions capable of supplying the mass of 
nonproducers, as in the great urban agglomerations like 
Douala and Yaound~, where they permit Europeans as well as 
Africans to be abundantly provisioned at prices below 
those practised by local commerce"27 
In many rural areas, also, the Societies were powerful enough to keep prices 
down, as Antoine suggests in the following example: "In 1953, in a rural 
market, the market-boys were selling palm-oil at 100 to 124 Fr a bottle of 75 
centilitres, while the Provident Society, by buying oil from a neighboring 
Society, could sell it at 55 Fr a litre and still make a profit." 28 
In Yaound~ there were two large consumer cooperatives: the Cooperative des 
Travailleurs de Yaound~, with two thousand members and about four thousand 
users, and the mainly European Cooperative des Fonctionnaires et Militaires du 
Cameroun. The first did an annual business of 47 million francs in 1951, and 
the latter 60 million, about one-third of which consisted of orders from 
France. 29 Smaller cooperatives were created in the provincial centers. For 
example, in N'Tem, "The consumer cooperatives were created to make up for the 
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weakness of local commerce in the area of food supply to the African civil 
servants. 1130 Similarly businesses and plantations with large work forces 
placed standing orders with local Provident Societies; for example, the SEITA 
tobacco plantation purchased most of its staple food supplies from the Society 
at Saa. Even well outside the catchment area for Yaound~ itself, the Provi-
dent Societies report large amounts of money spent to purchase food for 
resale. In addition to negotiating direct sales from Provident Societies to 
consumer cooperatives, the Yaound~ Society also organized food markets, held 
three times a week, to which it supplied at least one truck for transport. 31 
Certain Societies also dealt in long-distance trade in food commodities. 
At Meiganga, in the pastoral Adamoua region, the Society owned a highly 
successful dairy, run by Europeans, which provided milk and butter to consumer 
cooperatives throughout the South. The Society at Dschang, in the temperate 
west, produced European varieties of fresh vegetables which were sold as far 
away as Yaound~. The rice mill owned by the Society at Nanga Eboko supplied a 
large proportion of the rice needs of the entire urban population. 
With long-distance trade and perishable products, access to capital to run 
the transport system was critical to the financial success which these model 
projects enjoyed. In fact, it appears that a disproportionate amount of the 
new capital available in the 1950s was spent on vehicles. Writing primarily 
of the north, Barboteu et al. show that: 
If one compares the volume of financial activities of the 
Provident Society, one is faced with the disproportionate 
importance of transport, which altogether accounts for 
seven times the grants to agriculture, three times the 
assistance to stock-raising and ten times the aid to 
forestry.... One can say without exaggeration, that the 
Provident Societies have become enterprises for transport 
and public works."32 
The Provident Society's single attempt at running a modern farm ended in 
failure. Although the farm at Mvog Betsi was said to be experimental, its. 
main function had always been the supply of goods to the European population. 
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Before the war it was owned by the government and worked by prisoners; after 
1946 it was put under Provident Society management and farmed by wage labor. 
It produced milk, vegetables, meat and oil on an annual interest-free advance 
from Provident Society funds. Due to rising wages, the farm made a loss in 
1948, which drew attention to the misuse of resources supposedly destined for 
the improvement of indigenous, not expatriate, production. 31 
The closest the Provident Society came to investment in production, and 
its largest single capital investment in Nyong-et-Sanaga, was the rice mill at 
Nanga Ebo ko. Rice had been introduced into the southern agricultural cycle 
during the 1920s. It was grown by order of the administration and used for 
feeding the laborers on road and railway construction. As the sanctions 
behind forced cultivation were abolished and cocoa became the major cash crop 
of the Yaound~ area, the areas in which people were willing to grow rice for 
the market became increasingly limited. The two remaining centers after 1946 
were Ntui and Nanga Eboko, on the fringes of the forest, where cocoa was less 
viable. In the early 1950s the efforts of all the Provident Society rice 
projects combined produced up to one-third of the amount of rice imported from 
Inda-China. In order to compete with imports, local production bad to be at 
least as good in quality, and cheaper. Hence the decision to invest in 
mechanized processing, under the supervision of the Provident Society, and to 
employ European technical expertise. All the growing, by contrast, was done 
on family farms, as a cash-earning activity. 
The expansion of the rice industry in Nanga Eboko was rapid. From 400 
tons sold in 1949 it went to 1,100 tons in 1953 to 1954, worth 44 million 
francs, more than ten times the business of the next most important local 
Society in the Yaound~ area. 34 This enterprise was often cited, along with 
the dairy at Meiganga, as one of the major achievements of Provident Society 
investment. In fact, the volume of production suggests that a very high 
proportion of the total population was probably producing for this industry. 
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To support the whole effort, the Society employed eleven extension workers and 
built nineteen paddy storehouses scattered through the producing area. There 
is no doubt that the scheme had an important effect on both producer and 
consumer. 
After 1960, its viability was seriously threatened. A report for 1965 
still claimed that "The Provident Society of Nanga Eboko has a very important 
place in the economic activity of the Department, n36 but this appears to be 
a much too optimistic view. Tissandier' s study of Zengoago, a village about 
30 km from Nanga Eboko on the main road, gives a picture of decline. In 1964 
rice cultivation had been all but abandoned due to the "bad financial 
situation of the Provident Society, during the two previous years ... 37 In 
1963 the harvest was only purchased six months later, and poor storage meant 
that about a quarter of the paddy was lost. 
study, only one farmer cleared a rice plot. 
During 1964, the year of the 
The report quoted above still 
credits the factory with a total output of about the same level as in 1953, 
but at the same time it admits to serious problems. Contrary to Baboteu et 
al 's claim that the southern Societies bad been disbanded by this time, this 
report shows that membership dues were still being paid in 1965, and the Nanga 
Eboko Society employed 73 people for a total payroll three times as large as 
its income from membership dues. 
The history of the Nanga Eboko rice industry, incomplete as it is, illus-
trates the vulnerability of projects run by the Provident Societies. Although 
the plant itself was heavily capitalized, the product was labor intensive, 
giving poor returns which were unattractive to the producers when other 
alternatives emerged. The enterprise was not commercially viable without 
preferential access to funds for both working and fixed capital. When these 
two conditions were undermined, it lost its competitive advantage and began to 
crumble, leaving the twin albatrosses of an unpopular compulsory membership 
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system and a large number of employees, in what was described by Tissandier as 
a very poor local economy. 
The decline of the Provident Societies leaves one with the questions of 
how the food supply continued to function, and on what basis it could be 
reconstructed. This, in turn, leads back to the question of whether the 
Provident Society/consumer cooperative structure really monopolized the market 
to the extent I have suggested, and if not, what other structures coexisted 
with it. At sixty thousand in 1957, the population of Yaounde!! town was 
clearly too large to be fed exclusively tbrougb the Societies, even if a large 
proportion produced their own food. Some kind of indigenous marketing system 
certainly began to form, but the evidence suggests that it drew on very local 
sources where the costs of transport and bulking were minimal. 
The evidence is fragmentary and circumstantial. Binet' s family budget 
survey suggested that in 1954 "food does not find a market except in small 
amounts and in very limited areas. 113 8 Records contain no reference to 
organizations of indigenous food traders in the Yaounde!! area, although lists 
of the major cooperatives were published annually in the Report to the United 
Nations. By contrast, food wholesalers in Douala organized themselves into 
the Cooperative des Fournisseurs de Vivres de Douala as early as 1946, with a 
membership of 388. They avoided the problems of motor transport by making 
most of their purchases along the Douala-Nkongsamba railway line and shipping 
by rail. They also, like the consumer cooperatives, purchased rice in bulk 
from Nanga Eboko Provident Society. 39 Such an organization is likely to 
have constituted a lobby with the municipal government on issues like market 
1 icenses and taxes. Certainly African traders in Yaounde!! complained in 1953 
that market conditions there discriminated in favor of European merchants and 
that the licenses (droits de place) were more expensive than in Douala. The 
only traders totally exempt from market taxes were producers who brought their 
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own goods to sell in amounts weighing less than 30 kilos or worth less than 
250 francs. 40 Finally, one can detect signs of a continuing anxiety about 
the price of food in Yaound~. For example in 1955 the municipal government 
set up a cafeteria for workers which served meals at subsidized prices to 
about 500 people per day.4 1 
Taken together the evidence suggests that the growing indigenous sector in 
the food trade was very small scale and possibly dominated by producers sell-
ing their own crops to consumers without any intermediary wholesale system 
whatever. Wholesale trade remained in the hands of semi-governmental insti-
tut ions, whereas in Douala it was dominated by indigenous enterprise. The 
Yaound~ food producers had been integrated into the market in an abstract 
sense, but not into a commercial system. As the Provident Societies faced 
financial ruin, the institutional links between producers and consumers 
collapsed. The situation in Yaound~ deserved the critique which Barbotou et 
al made of the whole system in 1962, namely that the Provident Societies had 
made the market system function by substituting their own institutions for any 
initiatives which might have come from the rural population itself. 
In the Yaound~ area, the Provident Society functioned like a public 
enterprise; it took over and controlled a sector of the economy which, under 
the political and economic circumstances of the time, could not be left to 
private enterprise. Possibly most regional Provident Societies took this 
role. However, it was not the long-term intention to set up a state-run 
economic sys tern. In principle, the Provident Societies were intended to 
stimulate private enterprise and market orientation in the rural areas. In 
terms of an ultimate vision of how the economy should function, it was a 
highly ambiguous policy. One has less the the impression of ideological 
direction than of a major effort to make the economy more productive, quickly, 
in whatever way happened to work best. 
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Regional variations in the use which local populations were able to make 
of their Provident Societies show that there were different possibilities. 
Two other areas in the South lie on each side of the "norm" which the Yaound~ 
case may represent. In the Mungo Region, indigenous private enterprise was 
very successful in making use of Provident Society investment funds, while in 
Sanaga Maritime the Provident Society hardly functioned at all. 
In the Mungo region the Provident Society was controlled by commercial 
growers of bananas for export. They made it into an extremely lively business 
venture, which made producer loans, and financed transport and marketing for 
the national consumer market as well as for export. It was by far the most 
active Society, managing to do an annual business in the mid-1950s worth 128 
times the value of the compulsory dues paid by the members. 42 This 
contrasts with the national average ratio of seventeen to one. At the other 
extreme, the Provident Society of Sanaga Maritime only functioned at a 
business-to-dues ratio of five to one, indicating that little use was made of 
the system by either the farmers or the administration. The difference 
relates to local conditions. The Mungo farmers were already an established 
force by the 1930s. 43 The Bassa people of Sanaga Maritime, by contrast, had 
resisted involvement in new export crops and were in direct and- violent 
opposition to the government throughout the 1950s. In the Mungo the Provident 
Society presented an opportunity for accumulation by indigenous entrepreneurs, 
while in Sanaga Maritime it remained on the level of a straight tax 
mechanism. In the first case it supported structural change in the regional 
economy, the expansion of Camerounian-owned plantations in competition with 
expatriate enterprises. In the second it produced little except increased 
antagonism between producers and the colonial government. 
The differences in outcome are not due to differences in state policy 
about rural investment. They are better explained as a function of the 
ongoing relationship between the state and different rural populations. The 
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same policy found different populations in different states of responsiveness, 
due to the way in which previous policies and indigenous institutions had 
affected one another. 
population to another. 
At any one time these relations differ from one 
But even considering one population alone, their 
"responsiveness" must be seen in time perspective. The reasons why Yaound~ 
lacked a food-marketing infrastructure in 1920 are different from the reasons 
in 1945 or in 1960. A series of policies bad been aimed at guaranteeing an 
adequate urban food supply, each of which influenced the development of the 
indigenous system. The Provident Society, like the policies before it, did 
not contribute to major structural change in the food economy; it did not 
"capture" the food sector. But neither did it float over the surface without 
any influence whatsoever. Its very success was a formidable obstacle to the 
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